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SUSANNE BOBZIEN
how can 1, the agent, be held responsible for my actions/choices, if everything, including my actions/choices is determined, predetermined, or necessitated by god, fate, providence, necessity, or various other external and/or internal causal factors? This is the problem which for example the early Stoics faced.
With a concept of moral responsibility based on a concept of freedom to do otherwise, determinists tend to face a very different kind of difficulty: the problem of the compatibility of freedom to do otherwise and determinism. In accordance with the threefold distinction of indeterminist freedom, three problems can be distinguished: a the problem of the compatibility of freedom to do otherwise and determinism * the problem of the compatibility of freedom of decision and determinism * the problem of the compatibility of freedom of the will and determinism All three problems are often referred to as "the free-will problem," although only the third actually involves a notion of a free will. The label "free-will problem" is also sometimes used for the problem of the compatibility of autonomy and determinism, namely when the agent is thought to have a faculty of the will, and it is by means of this faculty that the agent decides between different courses of actions. Quite often it is taken to be "understood," and is hence left completely unclear, what an author means when talking about "free will" and "the free-will problem." In the following I reserve the expression "free will" for the kind of freedom I called "freedom of the will" above. To avoid confusion, I use the phrase "free-will problem" sparingly, and for the above-mentioned three problems only.
Modern philosophers tend to concentrate on physical or causal determinism based on principles of the kind "same causes, same effects" or "like causes, like effects," and the prevalent types of free-will problem are those of the compatibility of universal causal determinism with freedom to do otherwise or freedom of decision. Few philosophers nowadays would postulate a faculty of the will. The earliest unambiguous evidence for the awareness of any kind of "free-will problem" occurs in Alexander of Aphrodisias. It resembles the problems modern philosophers discuss in that it is concerned with a theory of universal causal determinism which contains a principle of the type "same causes, same effects," and in that it involves a concept of indeterminist freedom without invoking a concept of the will. It is with the "discovery" of this kind of problem that I am concerned with primarily in this paper.
The historical treatment of the question of freedom and determinism is THE FREE-WILL PROBLEM 137 exacerbated by the fact that almost all key terms and phrases used to describe the problems involved are hopelessly vague or ambiguous. This is no different in Greek and Latin than in English. Many phrases and statements in philosophical texts before Alexander are -at least at first sight -compatible with an interpretation as concerning indeterminist freedom. However, there is a conspicuous absence of any unambiguous account of indeterminist freedom, and of any philosophical problems that would involve such a concept.2 I have therefore adopted the strategy of denying the awareness of a concept of indeterminist freedom and of the free-will problem (in any of its manifestations) as long as there are neither textual evidence nor philosophical reasons for assuming the opposite. On the following pages I shall first present the situation as we find it in Alexander; then sketch the development that leads to that state of the discussion; and finally interpret the problems presented by Alexander and some related philosophers in the light of the development that led up to them.
II. The state of the debate in Alexander
In Alexander's treatise On Fate we are presented with a kind of stalemate situation between two philosophical positions: the Stoic compatibilist determinist one and Alexander's Peripatetic and -seemingly -libertarian one. These positions are characterised by their stand (i) on causal determinism and (ii) on that which depends on us (o ep' E'i^dv). The expression "depending on us" is central to much of the debate: both parties are agreed that moral appraisal for an action presupposes that the action depends on the agent, or is Fir' aiXT-.
The Stoic compatibilist position is orthodox and stands in the Chrysippean tradition. Like Chrysippus these later Stoics are concerned with the compatibility of universal causal determinism with moral responsibility based on the idea of autonomy (MR1). They maintain that everything is fated, and define fate in terms of a network of causes. They hold that there is no change without a cause and that every change and every event has preceding causes (Fat. 191.30-192.14). The most remarkable element of their determinism is the formulation of a causal principle whose function it is to back up their basic assumption that there is no change without cause (Fat. 192.22 ). This principle is not recorded for any earlier Stoics. It states that in the same circumstances the same cause will necessarily bring about exactly the same effect:
... that it is impossible that, when all the same circumstances around the cause and that of which it is a cause are present, things should sometimes not happen in a certain way and sometimes should so happen. (Alex. Fat. 192.224)3
Universal causal determinism is thus guaranteed; both in the Stoic sense, in which causes are bodies which actively bring about their incorporeal effects; and in the common modem sense that the same cause in the same circumstances brings about the same effect, where both cause and effect are understood as events. The Stoics in Alexander argue for the compatibility of this physical theory with moral responsibility by means of their concept of what depends on us. They define that which depends on us as that which happens through us (8t' giov), i.e. that which is the result of impulse and assent, and in which the nature of the agent manifests itself. 4 We are thus the main causal factor of our actions and can consequently be held morally responsible for them.
The opposing Peripatetic position which Alexander puts forward is less clear. Instead of a uniform stand, there is a variety of views, alternating, and occasionally fused, a point to which I return later. But there is evidence for a position that proposes freedom to do otherwise and which resembles up to a point modem notions of freedom of decision. For example, we find the account: "depending on us" is predicated of the things over which we have in us the power of also choosing the opposite. (Alex. Fat. 181.5) and the explicit requirement that this choosing has to be independent of preceding causes:
we have this power of choosing the opposite and not everything that we choose has pre-determining causes, because of which it is not possible for us not to choose this. It should be plain that the positions of the two parties in the debate are incompatible. The Stoics maintain that every change in the world is causally determined by preceding causes. The same cause, under the same circumstances will necessarily bring about the same effect. The Peripatetic claim is that there are some changes in the world that are causally undetermined; and among these are the things that depend on us. In the very same situation, we, the very same causes (causes understood as corporeal entities), could choose one time one way, another time another way, undetermined in our decision by external and internal causal factors. It is essential to see that there is no solution to this conflict: causal determinism and partial causal indeterminism are mutually exclusive.
But although the text implies awareness of a problem of the compatibility of freedom and determinism, the discussion seems to have focused on a different problem: the question is not "which is the correct concept of freedom?" (It is telling that there is no word for "freedom" used in the debate; whether or what concepts of freedom are involved in the opposed theories has to be inferred from the context. The unfortunate custom of translating the Greek phrase ?' ijWtv by "free-will" or cognates of "free" simply begs the question.) The question of the debate in Alexander is rather: "which is the right concept of what depends on us?", i.e. "which concept provides a sufficient condition for the possibility of moral appraisal?" And here two very dissimilar underlying theories collide. To understand the nature of this controversy, we have to realise that the two parties work with two fundamentally different conceptions of what depends on us. For this we need to make explicit the different ways in which the phrase "depending on someone", or rather the Greek Enid with dativus personae could be understood. The phrase apparently could denote both what I have named a "one-sided, causative" concept of what depends on someone, and what I call a "two-sided, potestative" concept of what depends on someone.
The two-sided, potestative version is well-attested (cf. e.g. LSJ e'i, I.1g). It refers to a power for alternative kinds of behaviour; it depends on me whether something happens (or will happen). When I call this kind 140 SUSANNE BOBZIEN of depending on us "two-sided," I mean that if something x depends on us, then not x depends on us, too. Thus, in the two-sided, potestative understanding, "up to us" would be a good translation of the Greek expression: for example, if walking is up to me, so is not walking, and vice versa. In this understanding of "what depends on us", the class of things that depend on us includes unrealised possibilities. For example, when at a certain time walking depends on me, then not walking depends on me, too. But I will be able only either to walk or not to walk at that time. Hence either one or the other will remain an unrealised possibility.
Note that the two-sided, potestative ?p' i8itv itself entails neither determinism nor indeterminism. A reading compatible with determinism (and indeterminism) is this: walking depends on me at a certain time if at that time I have the general two-sided capacity for walking -even if in the specific situation it is fully causally determined that I will (or that I will not) walk.5
But, importantly, the two-sided, potestative ezp' ijiiv can also be understood as indeterminist in the following way: at a certain time walking depends on me, if at that time it is causally undetermined whether or not I (will) walk, and it depends on my free decision whether or not I (will) walk. When the expression is understood as two-sided, potestative in this way, the "we" ("us") in 9p' igiv takes on an interesting role: the "us" in e.g. "walking depends on us" is given the status of an active decisionmaker. We decide whether or not we walk. Instead of a general capacity had at a certain time, in this case there is a power for undetermined deciding between, and initiating, courses of action. This is a very different kind of capacity. And in this case, if something depends on me, then I have the indeterminist freedom to do and not to do it (cf. section XI).
Things are quite different again in the case of the one-sided, causative E(p' hIilv. When I call the phrase "one-sided", I understand this to entail that if something x depends on us, then not-x does not depend on us; and I A related reading compatible with determinism (and indeterminism) is this: walking depends on me at a certain time if at that time I have the general two-sided capacity for walking, and nothing (or nothing external) forces me to walk or prevents me from walking -even if in the specific situation it is fully causally determined whether or not I will walk. This adds to the previous reading my freedom (of type 5 above), i.e. the additional requirement of the agent's being neither hindered from nor forced to follow up either alternative. Still differently, a two-sided potestative concept of ?p' higiv that is neutral towards determinism and indeterminism can also be used for action types without reference to a specific time. So walking may be said to be the sort of thing that is generally up to human beings.
by "causative" I refer to the fact that the prepositional phrase in "x depends on y" refers to that which is the cause or reason of x. In this case a translation like "attributable to us" may be preferable. If at a certain time my walking is attributable to me, then it is not the case that my not walking is attributable to me, too. For in the assumed situation my not walking does not obtain at all. Here, the natural understanding of "x depends on us" is that it expresses who has the causal responsibility for the thing or action in question. "The walking is attributable to you" translates into "You are causally responsible for your walking." The "we" in ep' i1ilv now expresses the cause of what happens and depends on us.
The one-sided, causative ezp' itliv, too, can be used in the description of an indeterminist as well as a deterninist system. However, whereas the two-sided Ep' ij^Iv can be used to express an element of undeterminedness, by implying that we, qua decision-makers, can decide freely between alternative options, the one-sided "depending on us" cannot be so used. Its function is to help to distinguish between different types of "causes" of events, not to imply the possibility of freedom to do otherwise.6 The onesided, causative concept of what depends on us is not a concept of any kind of freedom, but of a particular kind of causal dependency. However, it presupposes a certain kind of freedom: freedom (type 6) from being externally determined to act; or freedom (type 5) from being in any way forced to act and prevented from acting. Note that these concepts of freedom are not the same as this concept of what depends on us. An action depends on me if (in some way) I bear causal responsibility for it and am in this sense its originator. It is in order for this to be possible that I must not be compelled to act or prevented from acting, i.e. that I must be free from external or from necessitating influences.
Depending on which conception of Eep' hij1v a philosopher works with, the concept of moral responsibility will differ. In the case of the one-sided, causative ?p' FI1iv moral responsibility is attached to someone if they are -in some sense -the main causal originator and thus autonomous (MR1). This is the position of the Stoics in Alexander. In the case of the indeterminist two-sided, potestative E'p' fi'iiv, moral responsibility is attached to someone if they are free to do otherwise; if they are not fully 3, on deliberation and deliberate choice (npoaipeot;), and III.5, on the question of whether we are morally responsible for our actions and our virtues and vices; and in the parallel sections in the Eudemian Ethics II.6 (1223al-9) and 11.10.
In EN III.3 Aristotle argues that deliberate choice is deliberate desire of those things that depend on us (EN 11 13al0-I 1). The things that depend on us are the things that we can bring about, as opposed to events brought about by nature, necessity, or chance, and also as opposed to those things only people other than us could bring about (EN 11 12a21-33). They are in the first instance actions (EN 111 2a31, 34). In 111.5 we learn that besides actions, virtues and vices depend on us (EN 11 13b3-11 15a3). Note the relation between deliberate choice and the things that depend on us: deliberate choice is choice of the things that depend on us, i.e. in the first instance of actions (EN 1113alO-11). That is, we deliberate about and choose between possible courses of actions. The choice we make (ipoaipsat;) is itself not one of the things that depend on us, and the idea that it was would have been quite alien to Aristotle's thinking.
There is however one factor in Aristotle's concept of what depends on us which we also have in Alexander: its "two-sidedness." In EN III.5 we learn that if doing something depends on us, then not doing that same thing also depends on us, and vice versa (EN 111 3b7-8, cf. EE 1226a27-8), and this relational property of the concept is preserved in later Peripatetic philosophy. But Aristotle's concept of what depends us does not entail indeterminism. We have no reason to assume that he has anything more in mind than that the things that depends on us are those which on a generic level it is possible for us to do and not to do, given that we are not externally prevented from doing them. In the two Ethics, all the concept of what depends on us does is give the general range of courses of action from which we can choose. The concept is independent of (and prior to) Aristotle's concept of deliberate choice, and of any mental capacity we have. It is taken as a basic concept, undefined and generally understood, by means of which the scope of the objects of deliberate choice is determined.
Thus Aristotle's remarks on that which depends on us are a far shot from Alexander's definitions. In none of the passages does Aristotle give a philosophical definition of that which depends on us; nor is he concerned with fate or causal determinism; and certainly there is no mention of freedom to act or choose otherwise, circumstances and agent being the same. 12 This is the standard Stoic contrast, as we usually find it in Epictetus. For my present purposes the section on things included in fate but not fated is relevant. In all three sources this section differs from the rest of the Middle-Platonist theory in that (i) the only traces from Plato are a couple of examples tagged on in the section on chance; (ii) the passage is clearly based on a whole range of texts from Aristotle, which all dealt with "that which is not necessary.'6 It looks as if someone has taken a list of types of things that are not necessary, perhaps from Aristotle EN I11.3 1112a31-3, perhaps from some later, "updated," list,'7 and then has worked his way through the works of Aristotle, picking out and systematising the relevant sections. The passage draws from Aristotle's Physics, Metaphysics, Nicomachean Ethics, De Interpretatione and perhaps from the Categories. The list of things not necessary is of interest for two reasons: first, it includes that which depends on us (t6 rp' idv). Second, we do not simply have a presentation or co-ordination of bits from Aristotle, but a systematisation, in which at that a couple of distinctions and terms are added which we do not find, or do not find used in that way, in Aristotle. Regarding the origin of this passage, we may assume that it was compiled in the 2nd century A.D. at the latest. It may well be earlier. As I said above, the only bits from Plato in it are two examples tagged on to the section on chance. There is thus no reason to think that the author of the common source of the Middle-Platonist doctrine of fate is the originator of the passage. The rest of the Middle-Platonist fate theory stands without it, and vice versa. The original author of this bit of "MiddlePlatonist" theory could be equally well a Peripatetic or a Platonist -if indeed such a distinction made sense at the time. We may say the author was an Aristotle scholar.
The passage appears to have employed the following classificatory scheme: the most general term is the possible (6o &ivatov). It encompasses both the necessary (6o &avayKcaiov) and the contingent (TO E,V6XOeVOV): the necessary is determined as the possible the opposite of which is impossible; the contingent as the possible the opposite of which is possible, too But let us return to our Aristotle scholar and the subordination of that which depends on us to the contingent in the Middle-Platonist common source. There we find three types of the contingent: one part of the contingent is "for the most part," one "for the lesser part" and one "in equal parts."25 Those for the most part and for the lesser part are characterised as opposites. For example, if for the most part the weather is hot in August, it is cold, or not-hot, in August for the lesser part.26 On the other hand, the "in equal parts" is that which depends on us, as for instance walking and not walking, and in general acting and not acting.27
In Aristotle we find neither this threefold distinction of the contingent, nor the category of what is "in equal parts." However, there can be no doubt that this third category is derived from Aristotle's Int. 9 18a39-b9, and is meant to pick up what Aristotle calls "as it happens" (6noiep' evruXv) there.28 In chapter 9 of the De Interpretatione Aristotle investigates whether or in what way the Principle of Bivalence holds for future propositions. One of his problems is that, if all propositions that state something about the future are already true or false now, this fact could somehow entail that all future events are predetermined already now.29 Aristotle contrasts the "as it happens" with necessity and explains it as "it is no more thus than not thus (ouS&ev gi&ov), nor will it be" (Int. 18b9, cf. 19a 18), and it is about these (the things "as it happens") that one deliberates (Int. 18b31, cf. 19a9) Hence, I assume, our Aristotle scholar -or some earlier Aristotle exegete -simply reasoned as follows: the "as it happens" must be part of the contingent, since according to Aristotle it is not necessary. An expression, parallel to "for the most part" was then coined for this subtype of contingent, namely "in equal parts," based on Aristotle's phrase "no more thus than not thus." Since Aristotle says that the "as it happens" is concerned with deliberation and action, and this is -according to Aristotle himself -the sphere of that which depends on us, the Aristotle scholar concluded that the "as it happens" must be that which depends on us. This identification of the "in equal parts" with that which depends on us suggests that, unlike the "for the most part" and the "for the lesser part," the "in equal parts" was not given a statistical interpretation. The phrases "for the most part" and "for the lesser part" express probability in the sense that if it is, say, hot in August 95% of all years (of all days?), then it is "for the most part hot" in August. But our Aristotle scholar cannot have understood the statement "walking is 'in equal parts"' to mean "people walk 50% of the time; or 50% of the time relevant to walking." Rather, the idea must have been that in any situation of possible walking it is no more likely that the person walks than not -quite independently of how much people statistically actually walk.
In Nemesius we are twice given a definition of the "in equal parts"; it is "that of which we are capable of <doing> both it and its opposite." (aino te 5-va'geOa cal to a&vuce_ijeVoV avT*, Nem. Nat. hom. 104.6-7, 114.21-2). In the second passage this definition is followed by the explicit identification of the "in equal account "capable of <doing> both it and its opposite" will also be tied to an individual situation. That is, something depends on us at a certain time if at that time we are capable of doing both it and its opposite. But this is still ambiguous between (i) having at that time a general capacity to walk and being at that time (ii) un-predetermined or (iii) causally undetermined in our walking.3'
The vagueness in the definition of that which depends on us seems to be resolved in favour of an un-predeterministic or indeterministic concept, once the connection of that which depends on us with the problem of the truth-values of future propositions is fully taken into account. For in De Interpretatione 9 the problem of truth-values of future propositions is connected with the question of the undeterminedness of the future, more precisely, the undeterminedness of whether something will happen at a particular future time: it is not yet determined now whether there will be a sea-battle tomorrow. Here pairs of propositions about the occurring of future events are at issue, and the occurring is tagged to a particular time in the future: the occurring of a sea battle tomorrow versus the absence of the occurring of a sea battle tomorrow. Plainly the question here is not whether a sea battle (or anything else) has a general capacity of occurring, and whether it has that capacity now. The question is whether tomorrow a sea-battle will or will not take place. That is, starting out from one and the same situation, viz. the present one, it is assumed that something could or could not obtain at some later time; and it is at present undetermined whether or not it will obtain. Thus here we have expressly one necessary condition for indeterminist freedom to do otherwise: exactly the same antecedent situation is combined with the possibility of two opposed states of affairs obtaining in some later situation in such a way that the antecedent situation leaves it undetermined which of the later states will obtain. However, in Aristotle's De Interpretatione this is merely a matter of logic: Aristotle does not consider whether the present situation is causally responsible for what happens in the future. A fortiori, he does not ask whether definite truthbivalence of future propositions would entail that human decisions are causally predetermined. Second, Epictetus, spelling out parts of early Stoic philosophy, restricts that which depends on us to certain "mental events" or movements of the soul. Only the use of our impressions, that is giving assent to them or withholding it, depends on us, since these are the only things not subordinate to external force or hindrances. Assenting to impulsive impressions (paxvaaiat &pglyrwcai), i.e. impressions of something as desirable or to be avoided, is choosing a course of action. The realisation of what we have chosen to do does not depend on us, insofar as it is always possible that it is thwarted by external hindrances. The stress in Epictetus is on the points that it is oneself who chooses, and that one is not necessitated it is the recognition of choice as the specific activity through which human rational beings can have an influence in the world, and accordingly, to which moral appraisal is to be attached. (The issue was autonomy rather than freedom to do otherwise.) This is perhaps further corroborated by the fact that in several of the passages in Alexander that are most clearly indeterminist (see next section) the version of the account with "to act," and not the one with "to choose" occurs.
XI. The term i4ovaia in the accounts of what depends on us
On the other hand, the second change in Alexander's account -from "being capable of doing and not doing something" to "having the power But owing to the introduction of "doing/choosing something or its opposite," Kc6pto; and E4ouaia do not function in the same way anymore as they did in Aristotle and Epictetus: in the latter authors it was the fact that nothing hindered us from doing or choosing something that made us have control over them. In Alexander's account, the terms are (at least at times)58 understood differently: what makes us have control over things is the fact that we are causally undetermined in our decision and thus can freely decide between doing/choosing or not doing/choosing them. The element of free decision in Alexander's account thus lies not in the addition of the phrase "choosing or not choosing," but in the introduction of the term "Eoouaia." We can thus see that the change to tE>ouaia in the account may have been of great significance, since it provided a way to express that the agent is a causally undetermined decision maker. The introduction of the term into this context is then also one further step towards the concept of a free will, since such a concept requires an independent faculty of decision making. 
XII. The volatility of the concept of freedom to do otherwise
Thus it seems that in Alexander's accounts of what depends on us it was rather the expression Eto1.aia than aripeita0at that served to express the element of freedom of decision. We saw at the beginning that Alexander had a concept of freedom to do otherwise. We have now seen how this concept developed, absorbing both Stoic and Aristotelian and perhaps Platonic elements on its way. However, we would be quite wrong to assume that at the turn of the 2nd century a general awareness of the problem of causal determinism and freedom to do otherwise had arisen, and that it had become part of the philosophical standard repertory of the time. There are several points that suggest that at his time Alexander is almost an isolated case, and that concepts of freedom to do otherwise are a rather marginal phenomenon without a clear philosophical context. First, it is noteworthy that the one-sided, causative conception of what depends on us was by no means peculiar to the Stoic system, nor generally seen as a feeble attempt of the Stoics to nominally save moral responsibility -even if Alexander wants to make us believe this (Fat. ch. 13). On the contrary, it seems to have been regarded as a serious alternative or as a complement to the two-sided, potestative conception in 2nd and 3rd century Middle-Platonist and Peripatetic writings. We find non-Stoic accounts of such concepts in [Plutarch] On Fate ("That which depends on us is that part of the contingent which is already happening in accordance with our impulse"),60 in the Mantissa, and in Nemesius. Had the general concern at the time been to preserve freedom to do otherwise as a prerequisite for We deliberate about the things that depend on us and that can be done;... All groups of human beings deliberate about the things that can be done through them ... we deliberate about those things which come to be through us and not always in the same manner.63 (Arist . EN 11 12a30-b4 
